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This study empirically investigates the effectiveness of international environmental 
agreements (IEA). Although there exists large number of empirical studies regarding IEA 
effectiveness, much of those studies focus on ratification decisions and regulated 
environmental behaviors at country level. This approach, however, is limited for investigating 
the attributes of different treaties and identifying factors affecting the success of IEA. To 
avoid this limitation, this study develops a treaty-level panel data including 14 environmental 
agreements adopted and entered into force last 20 years. This aggregated approach enables to 
look further insights regarding the attributes of each IEA, and identify the factors 
significantly affecting the effectiveness of agreements. 
From our results, several treaty-specific attributes are shown to be significant. 
Specifically, sanction for non-compliance is the most influential inducement for the 
effectiveness of IEA. A mechanism of financial assistance for less-capable developing 
countries is also found to be positive inducement, but mechanism of technical assistance is 
not significant at any statistical levels. Our results also indicate that involving larger number 
of countries, especially large-scale fast-growing developing countries such as BRICs, is 
another significant factor. Although this is not compatible with a strict sanction for 
non-compliance, introducing well-designed financial mechanism may be one of possible 
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The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: 




As environmental problems becomes out-of-boundaries and more regional and global 
issues, the international environmental agreements (IEA) has received rapidly increasing 
attention1. This treed is particularly significant since 1990s. From 1990 to 1999, a total of 86 
multilateral environmental agreements were adopted. In contrast, only 49 and 56 were 
adopted in 1970s and 1980s, respectively (United Nations Environment Programme, 2005)2. 
A comprehensive IEA database developed by Mitchell (2002-2010) now includes 
approximately 1,000 multilateral and more than 1,500 bilateral environmental agreements.  
Given greater recognition of the IEA, a number of empirical studies have been 
conducted, and many of these studies show that the effect of IEA is significant (See Helm and 
Sprinz, 2000, Mitchell, 2004, Young, 1999 for comprehensive review). Although much of 
these literatures focuses on single particular treaty such as the Long Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution (LRTAP), this type of analysis cannot provide overall effectiveness of IEA. To 
overcome this difficulty, there have been a growing number of studies analyzing more than 
one environmental agreement in a single analytical framework.  
More specifically, quantitative analyses of multiple environmental agreements are of 
two types. The first type is to assess decisions of ratification and their determinants (For 
example, Roberts, et al., 2004, Ward, 2006). These studies can provide an important 
information regarding factors attracting more countries to the treaty, but they do not reveal 
the relationship between ratification and environmental outcome.  
The second type is, as fully described in, to directly analyze the effect of ratification and 
environmental outcome under different IEAs using multiple regression models. This 
approach should provide insightful implications regarding ratification-environment relations, 
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but existing studies are quite limited. One exception is Murdoch et al. (2003), they 
investigated both ratification decisions of the treaties and subsequent environmental 
behaviors using a set of regression equations. However, they estimated the model for each 
treaty, and do not combine the treaties. Analyzing different IEA in a single analytical model is 
difficult due in part because environmental behaviors regulated are different among IEA. 
They tend to use different units and make comparison study difficult empirically. See 
Mitchell (2004) for technical discussions. 
One of major limitations of these existing literatures is that they do not explicitly 
consider the attributes, or characteristics of IEA, although they are of great importance in 
terms of regime effectiveness (Mitchell, 2010). A considerable challenge for the creators of 
international environmental agreements is how to design mechanisms that deter defection 
without deterring participation (von Stein, 2008). Relatively ‘‘soft’’ law often garners 
widespread participation, but it creates few concrete incentives for states to improve behavior. 
In addition, the effectiveness of IEA depends on factors that negotiators cannot control, such 
as how many countries contribute the problem, scientific uncertainty about a issue, and the 
level of concentration of the regulated behavior Weiss and Jacobson (1998). To fill the 
academic gap and investigate the effects of different attributes on the success of IEA, we 
need to employ an empirical approach different from past studies.  
The objective of this study is to empirically investigate the effectiveness of IEA, using a 
treaty-level panel data. That is, data is developed using a treaty as a unit of analysis, in 
contrast to vast majority of studies which use country as an analytical unit. In this study, we 
develop a panel data including 14 environmental agreements adopted and entered into force 
last 20 years. The data is then analyzed using the fixed-effects and random-effects models as 
well as the Pooled OLS. This aggregated approach enables to look further insights regarding 
the attributes of each IEA, and identify the factors influencing the effectiveness of 
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agreements.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model to examine the effect of 
treaty attributes and other factors on the effectiveness of IEA. After presenting the model, this 
section also describes the data and their sources. Section 3 presents the results estimated from 
the fixed-effects and random-effects models as well as the pooled OLS model. Given 
interpretation and discussion of the results, section 4 summarizes and concludes this study. 
  
 
2. Empirical procedures 
This section explains empirical procedures conducted in this study. First we present the 
estimated model. We then describe data and their sources. 
 
The model 
Consider the following model explaining the effectiveness of IEA: 
                         xit it it i ity zα β γ ν ε= + + + +                       (1) 
where ity  represents the IEA effectiveness, defined by an overall (mean of all ratified 
countries) change in regulated behavior for treaty i in year t. If a regulated behavior is 
pollutant emissions such as the LRTAP and Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, this variable is 
defined by annual rate of change in emission reduction (not emission itself). If a regulated 
behavior is conservation such as the Convention of Biological Diversity, this is defined by 
annual rate of change in increase in protected areas. Thus, higher values of ity  indicate 
greater compliance in regulated behavior for each IEA. 
X  is a matrix of explanatory variables regarding ratified countries, such as per capita 
GDP and population. Note that these vary across both time and treaties. Z  is a matrix of 
explanatory variables regarding the attributes of treaty, such as number of ratified countries, 
 4 
sanction procedures for non-compliance, and mechanics for aiding incapable developing 
countries. Note that some variables in Z  vary across treaties but not across time. This is 
because the characteristics of the IEA are defined when the treaty is adopted, and they do not 
change unless amendments are proposed and adopted. 
In equation (1), i itν ε+  is the residual of the model. iν  is the treaty-specific residual, 
which differs across treaties, but constant within any particular treaty (i.e. time-invariant). 
This 
iν  can be viewed as an unobservable heterogeneity of each treaty. There are a number 
of relevant factors of IEA affecting the effectiveness, but some of those are either not 
available or cannot observable for researchers. For example, there is no way to collect the 
variables representing the quality and quantity the secretariat office, and public perception of 
the treaty are difficult to obtain, or not available at all. However, if they are significant factors 
affecting the effectiveness, omitting these variables results in biased and inconsistent 
estimates. This hypothesis is explicitly tested in next section. 
itε  is the “usual” residual 
which is 0 conditional mean, uncorrelated with iν , and homoskedastic.  
 If equation (1) is true, then it must be also true that 
                          xit i i i ity zα β γ ν ε= + + + +                          (2) 
where ity , x i , iz , and itε  are their means. Subtracting (2) from (1) provides 
time-demeaned transformation of the variables and results in the following: 
                        ( ) ( ) ( )x xit i it i it iy y β ε ε− = − + −                       (3) 
This is known as the fixed-effects estimator — also known as the within estimator. The major 
drawback of this model is that, as seen in the equation, this  
         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 x x z 1it i it i i i i it iy y zθ θα θ β θ β θ ν ε θε− = − + − + − + − + −       (4) 
where θ  is a function of 2νσ  and 2εσ . If 2 0νσ =  (that is, iν  is always 0), then θ  
becomes 0 and equation (4) reduces to the OLS. If 2 0εσ =  (that is, iε  is 0), then θ  
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becomes 1 and the models turns to the fixed-effects estimator. The fixed-effects model is 
appropriate if the differences between treaties can be viewed as parametric shits of the 
regression function. In other settings, it might be more appropriate if to view iν  as randomly 
distributed across treaties. This assumption will produce the random-effects model. For more 
technical details of the fixed-effects and random-effects models, see Wooldridge (2001). 
StataCorp (2009) also offers an excellent summary of the panel data models. 
 
Data 
To estimate the model presented above, extensive information regarding the IEA and ratified 
countries need to be collected from various sources. Such information includes three types 
including: (1) regulated behaviors under the treaty; (2) treaty attributes; and (3) 
socio-economic conditions of ratified countries. We present these data and their sources 
below. 
 
(1) Regulated behaviors under the treaty 
Different treaties regulate different environmental behaviors. This study collects a wide 
variety of pollutant emissions and conservation efforts for each of the treaties considered in 
our analysis. First, for the Protocols related to the Convention on Long-range Transboundary 
Air Pollution (LRTAP), emission data are obtained from the Centre on Emission Inventories 
and Projections (CEIP)3. However, this officially-reported raw data is inconsistent and/or 
incomplete in some parties and time periods. To avoid these data problems, as suggested by 
the CEIP, we use emissions data as used in the EMEP models. These emission data is based 
on officially reported emissions to the extent possible, but some of the officially reported data 
have been corrected and/or gap-filled (Centre on Emission Inventories and Projections, 
2009)4. This emission data from the EMPE models includes all primary pollutants regulated 
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under the LRTAP-related Protocols, those include: Sulphur dioxide (SO2); Nitrogen oxide 
(NO2); Non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC); Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(POPs); and heavy metals. 
For the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and subsequent 
4 amendments for each party is collected from Ozone Secretariat website(United Nations 
Environment Programme, 2010). Although there are a number of different Ozone depleting 
substances, consumption of Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) is used for analysis in this study 
given data availability and relative importance and depleting potential. 
The Basel Convention regulates the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. A 
country-level total hazardous waste generation data from 1997 to 2006 is obtained from the 
Secretariat website (Basel Convention, 2010). 
For the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), unlike other pollutants, country-level CO2 emission data are readily 
available and there are several sources. In this study, the total emission from is obtained fro 
the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2009). 
Finally, the Convention of Biological Diversity is difficult to analyze quantitatively, 
because this Convention deals with wide variety of environmental and ecological entity and 
many of relevant data are not available. We follow the International Environmental 
Agreements (IEA) Database developed by Mitchell (2002-2010) and use the ratio of area 
protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area. This should be reasonable because 
maintaining and enhancing areas protected should correlate with various behaviors toward 
environmental and ecological protection regulated under the Convention. The dataset is also 
obtained from Mitchell (2002-2010).  
 
(2) Treaty attributes 
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We use the following 4 explanatory variables regarding the attributes of each treaty. They are 
mainly adapted from the International Regime Database (IRD) developed by Breitmeier et al. 
(2006). For relatively recent treaties that are not included in the IRD, we code the variables 
from the original treaty documents and Register of International Treaties and Other 
Agreements in the Field of the Environment published by the UNEP (2005). 
Sanction is binary indicator and is 1 if treaty provides a formal compliance mechanism 
for non-complying countries5. Consider is 1 if the treaty has a special considerations for 
developing countries in terms of regulations. For example, Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer has dual regulations for developing ad developing countries. 
Such considerations may attract more countries (especially developing countries) to ratify a 
treaty. Financial and Technical take a value of 1 if a treaty includes a mechanism for financial 
and technical assistance for developing countries, respectively.  
The data also includes two country-specific dummies. First, BRICs is binary indicator, 
which take a value of 1 if a treaty includes at least one of BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China). Next, US is also binary variable, taking a value of 1 if the United States 
ratifies a treaty i. These dummies may be significant, at either positive or negative, if a 
participation of large-scale and fast-growing countries is significant factor for making a treaty 
effective or ineffective. 
 
(3) Socio-economic conditions of ratified countries 
Per capita GDP (2000 constant price) is used for a model as an indicator of average income 
levels for ratified countries. This variable is taken from the World Development Indicators 




3. Results and Discussion 
The estimated coefficients and their robust standard errors from the Pooled OLS, 
fixed-effects, and random-effects models are presented in table 1. First of all, note that the 
fixed-effects model eliminates any time-invariant variables from analysis. In our case, a total 
of 6 treaty-specific attribute variables as well as intercept are dropped out from the model.  
To identify an appropriate model for our analysis, we conduct the Wu-Hausman test for 
the fixed-effects and random-effects models. Under the null hypothesis, the two estimates 
should not differ systematically and a test can be based on the difference6. The test statistic is 
sufficiently small to accept null hypothesis, indicating that there is no systematic difference in 
the estimated coefficients among the fixed-effects and random-effects models. We then 
conduct the Lagrange multiplier test for an existence of the random-effects7. The null 
hypothesis of no random-effects is rejected at more than 1% significance level. This indicates 
that the use of random-effects model is appropriate for our analysis. This also indicates that 
using the Pooled OLS model is not appropriate for this analysis. This is because an 
unobserved heterogeneity among treaties, iν , is significant component of the model. We thus 
examine the fixed-effects or random-effects models for further details to find the most 
appropriate model in this study. 
Next, using the random-effects model, we interpret the estimated coefficients and their 
significance to identify the factors affecting the effectiveness of IEA. Overall, the models fit 
the data reasonably well. Many of coefficients are significant at 1 or 5 statistical level and 
their signs are almost as expected. Specifically, the coefficient of Sanction is positive and its 
marginal effect is highest among all other treaty-specific variables. Although many of 
existing IEA do not include sanction measures for greater participation in the treaty, our 
results strongly indicate that this is counterproductive in terms of regime effectiveness.  
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Table 1.  The estimated results of IEA effectiveness equation (heteroskedasticiy robust 
standard errors in parentheses) 
Dependent variable: overall changes in regulated behavior (CRB)
Variable Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Random-effects
Constant 0.696 — -0.079
(2.110) (0.140)
Ratified -0.001 ** 0.012 *** 0.013 ***
0.000 (0.005) (0.005)
Sanction 0.233 *** — 0.720 ***
(0.012) (0.010)
Consider 0.188 ** — 0.240 **
(0.099) (0.144)
Financial 0.367 * — 0.443 ***
(0.209) (0.121)
Technical 0.010 — 0.011
(0.044) (0.029)
GDPPC -0.020 -1.218 * -1.450 *
(0.016) (0.730) (0.786)
Non-OECD 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.076) (0.087) (0.060)
BRICs 0.191 *** — 0.161 ***
(0.038) 0.032
US 0.195 — 0.171
(0.285) (0.222)
n 157 157 157
within R 2 0.468 0.470
between R 2 0.607 0.673
overall R 2 0.434 0.499 0.572
 
Note: One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1% level. 
 
 
The coefficient of Financial is significant at 1% and its marginal effect is second 
highest among treaty-specific variables. This indicates that a mechanism for financial 
assistance for non-complying countries is a positive inducement for the effectiveness of IEA. 
This is expected because a number of developing countries do not ratify treaties due to 
insufficient financial resources to meet environmental behaviors regulated by the treaty. In 
contrast, the coefficient of Technical is not significant at any significance levels. 
The sign of Consider is positive and it is highly significant. There are several IEA 
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including such considerations. For example, Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) Phase-out 
Management Plan under the Montreal Protocol for the Ozone depleting substances have 
different targets and schedules for developed and developing countries. Such flexibility is 
attracting more countries to participate, and shown to be positive inducement for making 
treaties effective. 
Ratified represents a number of ratified countries for a treaty and its coefficient is 
positive and highly significant. Furthermore, the coefficient of BRICs is also positive and 
highly significant. These results suggest that the treaty is more likely to be effective if it 
attracts more countries. This is particularly true if a treaty can attract large-scale fast-growing 




4. Summary and Conclusions 
There has been a number of studies conducted empirical investigation of IEA effectiveness, 
but much of those studies focuses on ratification decisions and regulated environmental 
behaviors at country level. This approach is effective to explore the factors affecting each 
country’s ratification decisions, and subsequent environmental behaviors. However, this is 
limited for looking into various attributes of each treaty and identify factors relevant to the 
success of IEA. 
This study empirically investigates the effectiveness of IEA by developing a treaty-level 
panel data that includes 14 IEA adopted and entered into force last 20 years. This aggregated 
approach, using a treaty as a unit of analysis rather than country, enables to look further 
insights regarding the attributes of each IEA, and identify the factors significantly affecting 
the effectiveness of agreements. 
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From our results, several treaty-specific attributes are shown to be significant. 
Specifically, sanction for non-compliance is the most influential inducement for the 
effectiveness of IEA. A mechanism of financial assistance for less-capable developing 
countries is also found to be positive inducement, but mechanism of technical assistance is 
not significant at any statistical levels. Our results also indicate that involving larger number 
of countries, especially fast-growing developing countries such as BRICs, is another 
significant factor. Although this is not compatible with a strict sanction for non-compliance, 
introducing well-designed financial mechanism may be one of practical solutions for this 
incompatibility problem and making the IEA more attractive and more effective. 
Before closing this study, it must be pointed out that this study is limited in terms of the 
number of IEA considered for our empirical analysis. The most recent version of the IEA 
Database Project (Version 2010.1) includes about 1,000 multilateral, and more than 2,500 
bilateral agreements for various environmental and ecological issues (Mitchell, 2002-2010). 
Although many of those agreements cannot be a subject of analysis due to lack of relevant 
data, relevant information have become more and more accessible recently, due to several 
efforts including the International Regimes Database and IEA Database Project8. Updating 
the panel data and reanalyze the effectiveness using wider variety of IEA would be an 
important extension of this paper.
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Notes 
                                                   
1
  Mitchell (2003) defines that agreements consist of: (1) instruments designated as 
convention, treaty, agreement, accord, and protocols and amendments to such 
instruments; (2) instruments establishing intergovernmental commissions; (3) instruments, 
regardless of designation, identified as binding by reliable sources (e.g., by a secretariat, 
UNEP, or published legal analysis); or (4) instruments whose texts fit accepted 
terminologies of legally binding agreements.  
2
  Hereafter, the IEA is referred to as multilateral environmental agreements, those include 
the Conventions, Agreements, Protocols, and Amendments. The bilateral environmental 
agreements are not considered in this study. 
3
  This data is officially submitted by the parties to the LRTAP Convention to the European 
Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP) via the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
4
  For technical details of emissions data and their generation process, see European 
Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (2008) Emission Inventory Review 2008. 
Available at, http://www.ceip.at/fileadmin/inhalte/emep/pdf/Inventory_Review_2008.pdf. 
5
  In the IRD, a formal compliance is categorized by different types of provisions to achieve 
compliance. Those types include: (1) suspension of membership rights; (2) exclusion 
from membership; (3) imposition of financial/economic punishments; (4) Support for 
capacity building to enhance compliance, and others. 
6
  See Wooldridge (2001) for technical details. 
7
  We use the LM test developed by Baltagi and Li (1990), which modifies an original test 
proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980). The modified test allows for unbalanced data and 
reduces to the standard formula when data is balanced panel. See StataCorp (2009) for 
technical details. 
8
  Information associated with the attributes of IEA has been relatively easy to obtain, 
because they are available from official treaty documents. Data missing problem is 
particularly serious for information regarding the changes in environmental behaviors 
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 International environmental agreements used in this study 




1. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on the 
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 
percent 
- Primary objective: To provide for a 30 per cent reduction in sulphur emissions or 
transboundary fluxes by 1993. 
- Date of adoption: July 8, 1985 
- Date of entry into force: September 2, 1987 
- Ratified countries: 28 
- Pollutant used for analysis: SO2 (Gg) 
 
 
2. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary 
Fluxes 
- Primary objective: To provide for the control or reduction of nitrogen oxides and their 
transboundary fluxes. 
- Date of adoption: October 31, 1998 
- Date of entry into force: February 14, 1991 
- Ratified countries: 27 
- Pollutants used for analysis: NO+NO2 (Gg) 
 
 
3. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their 
Transboundary Fluxes 
- Primary objective: To enhance the framework for the control of long-range 
transboundary air pollution. 
- Date of adoption: November 18, 1991 
- Date of entry into force: September 29, 1997 
- Ratified countries: 22 




4. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on 
Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions 
- Primary objective: To set out measures to control and reduce sulphur emissions in 
order to protect human health and the environment from adverse effects. 
- Date of adoption: June 14, 1994 
- Date of entry into force: August 5, 1998 
- Ratified countries: 26 
                                                   
*
 The objective of each IEA is taken from UNEP (2005). 
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- Pollutant used for analysis: SO2 (Gg) 
 
5. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on the Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) 
- Primary objective: To control, reduce or eliminate discharges, emissions and losses of 
persistent organic pollutants. 
- Date of adoption: November 18, 1991 
- Date of entry into force: September 29, 1997 
- Ratified countries: 21 
- Pollutants used for analysis: Dioxide, hexachlorobenzene (HCB), Polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbon (PAH), Polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) (Gg) 
 
 
6. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on the Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on 
Heavy Metals 
- Primary objective: To control emissions of heavy metals caused by anthropogenic 
activities that are subject to long-range transboundary atmospheric transport and are 
likely to have significant adverse effects on human health or the environment.   
- Date of adoption: Jun 24, 1998 
- Date of entry into force: December 29, 2003 
- Ratified countries: 22 
- Pollutants used for analysis: Palladium (Pd), Cadmium (Cd), Hydrargentum (Hg) 
 
 
7. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
- Primary objective: To protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to 
control global emissions of substances that deplete it. 
- Date of adoption: September 16, 1987 
- Date of entry into force: January 1, 1989 
- Ratified countries: 196 
- Pollutant used for analysis: Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) (ODP Tons†) 
 
 
8. London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer 
- Primary objective: To strengthen the control procedures under the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987), to extend the coverage of the 
Protocol to new substances and establish financial mechanisms for the Protocol. 
- Date of adoption: June 29, 1990 
- Date of entry into force: August 10, 1992 
- Ratified countries: 194 
- Pollutant used for analysis: Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) (ODP Tons) 
 
 
9. Copenhagen Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer 
- Primary objective: To strengthen the control procedures under the Montreal Protocol 
                                                   
†
  Metric tons of Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) weighted by their Ozone Depletion Potential 
(ODP). 
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on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) to extend the coverage of the 
Protocol to new substances. 
- Date of adoption: November 25, 1992 
- Date of entry into force: June 14, 1994 
- Ratified countries: 191 
- Pollutant used for analysis: Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) (ODP Tons) 
 
 
10. Montreal Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer 
- Primary objective: To further strengthen the measures for the implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 
- Date of adoption: September 17, 1997 
- Date of entry into force: November 10, 1999 
- Ratified countries: 179 
- Pollutant used for analysis: Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) (ODP Tons) 
 
 
11. Beijing Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, 1999  
- Primary objective: To strengthen the control measures under the Montreal Protocol. 
- Date of adoption: December 3, 1999 
- Date of entry into force: February 25, 2002 
- ratified countries: 161 
- Pollutants used for analysis: Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) (ODP Tons) 
 
 
12. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal 
- Primary objective: To set up obligations for State Parties with a view to: (a) reducing 
transboundary movements of wastes subject to the Basel Convention to a minimum 
consistent with the environmentally sound and efficient management of such wastes; 
(b) minimizing the amount and toxicity of hazardous wastes generated and ensuring 
their environmentally sound management (including disposal and recovery 
operations) as close as possible to the source of generation; (c) assisting developing 
countries in environmentally sound management of the hazardous and other wastes 
they generate. 
- Date of adoption: March 22, 1989 
- Date of entry into force: May 5, 1992  
- ratified countries: 167 
- Pollutants used for analysis: Total Hazardous Waste Generation (1,000 tons) 
 
 
13. Convention on Biological Diversity 
- Primary objective: To conserve biological diversity, promote the sustainable use of its 
components, and encourage equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
utilization of genetic resources. Such equitable sharing includes appropriate access to 
genetic resources, as well as appropriate transfer of technology, taking into account 
existing rights over such resources and such technology. 
- Date of adoption: June 5, 1992 
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- Date of entry into force: December 29, 1993  
- ratified countries: 187 
- Pollutant used for analysis: Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to 
surface area (%) 
 
 
14. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
- Primary objective: To provide for policies and measures to undertake the commitment 
in Article 4 of the Convention, by setting quantified limitation and reduction 
objectives within specified timeframes for their anthropogenic emissions by sources 
and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. 
- Date of adoption: December 11, 1997 
- Date of entry into force: February 16, 2005 
- Ratified countries: 186 
-
 Pollutant used for analysis: CO2 
